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Abstract. Anomaly detection is used to monitor and capture traffic anomalies in 
network systems. Many anomalies manifest in changes in the intensity of network 
events. Because of the ability of EWMA control chart to monitor the rate of occurrences 
of events based on their intensity, this statistic is appropriate for implementation in 
control limits based algorithms. The performance of standard EWMA algorithm can be 
made more effective combining the logic of adaptive threshold algorithm and adequate 
application of fuzzy theory. This paper analyzes the theoretical possibility of applying 
EWMA statistics and fuzzy logic to detect network anomalies. Different aspects of fuzzy 
rules are discussed as well as different membership functions, trying to find the most 
adequate choice. It is shown that the introduction of fuzzy logic in standard EWMA 
algorithm for anomaly detection opens the possibility of previous warning from a 
network attack. Besides, fuzzy logic enables precise determination of degree of the risk. 
Key words: Network Anomaly Detection, EWMA, Fuzzy Rules, Membership Functions, 
Operators 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion detection is an area of computer security that involves the detection of 
unwanted manipulations to computer networks. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is 
required to detect all types of malicious network traffic and computer usage that cannot 
be detected by a conventional ﬁrewall (Fig. 1). 
This security method is needed in today’s computing environment because it is 
impossible to keep pace with the current and potential threats and vulnerabilities in our 
computing systems. An IDS may be categorized by its detection mechanism on: anomaly 
- based, signature - based or hybrid (uses both of previous technologies). 
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Fig. 1 IDS elementary configuration [1] 
When the IDS identifies intrusions as unusual behaviour that differs from the normal 
behaviour of the monitored system, this analysis strategy is called anomaly detection 2. 
The disadvantage of this method is the occurrence of a relatively large number of false 
alarms, i.e. network situations where the detection system indicates a non-existent attack. 
In order to reduce the appearance of false alarms, the measurement of the traffic activity 
is applied. The goal is to make a decision whether a network situation is attack or not. In 
order to make the correct decision, the behaviour profiles are defined: normal and 
abnormal profiles (simple thresholds (limit values) or complex statistical distributions). 
The false positive rate is considered one of the most important factors for performance 
evaluation of IDS. 
Anomaly detection learns a statistical or neural network model to figure out what is 
normal. The following techniques can use: Bayesian statistics, neural networks, expert 
systems and statistical decision theory. 
A number of anomalies are seen in changes in the intensity of events occurring in 
computer networks. Due to the ability of exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) 
control chart to supervise the event-occurrence rate on the basis of their intensity, this 
statistic can be implemented in control limits based algorithms. The effectiveness of the 
performance of standard EWMA algorithm can be increased when one combines the logic 
of adaptive threshold algorithm and adequate application of fuzzy theory. Fuzzy logic 
enables precise adjustment of degree of exceeding limit values (expressed in form of 
percentage). Different aspects of fuzzy rules are described in this paper, including different 
membership functions, trying to define the most suitable choice. The aim of this paper is to 
show the theoretical opportunity and examine the possible way of implementing EWMA 
statistics and fuzzy logic to detect network anomalies. 
EWMA statistics and fuzzy approach are not new in analyzing and detecting network 
anomalies and intrusions. Ye et al. [3] implemented Chi square distance metric to measure 
the deviation of the observed activities from the forecast of normal activities. The results 
indicate that the Chi square distance measure with the EWMA forecasting provides better 
performance in intrusion detection than that with the average-based forecasting method. 
Abdeh et al. [4] applied genetic fuzzy systems and showed that they are able to develop 
accurate and also interpretable intrusion detection systems. Yu et al. [5] developed a fuzzy 
model tuner, through which the user can tune the model fuzzily but yield much appropriate 
tuning. The results showed the system can achieve about 23% improvement. Works [6], [7] 
and [8] also point to the benefits of both approaches to improve the quality of transmission 
and predicting network anomalies. Senturk et al. in [9] combined popular control charts, 
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EWMA control chart for univariate data with fuzzy environment. The fuzzy EWMA control 
charts (FEWMA) can be used for detecting small shifts in the original data represented by 
fuzzy numbers (unlike this paper, in which fuzzy logic is applied in the decision-making 
phase based on the original network values). The FEWMA control charts decreases number of 
false decisions by providing flexibility on the control limits. Dickerson et al. [10] explored 
using fuzzy systems as the correlation engine for an IDS. Fuzzy systems have several 
important characteristics that suit intrusion detection: fuzzy systems can readily combine 
inputs from widely varying sources, many types of intrusions cannot be crisply defined, the 
degree of alarm that can occur with intrusions is often fuzzy. Researchers [11] developed the 
Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) using fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules. FIRE uses 
simple data mining techniques to process the network input data and generate fuzzy sets for 
every observed feature. The fuzzy sets are then used to define fuzzy rules to detect individual 
attacks. FIRE does not establish any sort of model representing the current state of the 
system, but instead relies on attack specific rules for detection. Instead, FIRE creates and 
applies fuzzy logic rules to the audit data to classify it as normal or anomalous. The authors 
found that the approach is particularly effective against port scans and probes. The primary 
disadvantage of this approach is the labor intensive rule generation process. Control charts 
have characteristics that can be successfully applied in detection of network anomalies - to 
detect shifts. In addition to the EWMA control charts, a CUSUM (cumulative sum) algorithm 
can be also used for monitoring of change-points, whose behaviour in the case of distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks is described in [31]. The authors in [32] implemented 
EWMA to detect anomalous changes in the intensity of a jamming attack event by using the 
packet inter-arrival feature of the received packets from the wireless sensor nodes. 
This paper consists of six sections. The introduction offers a terminological basis for the 
problem of intrusion detection, then in the second section a short overview of anomaly 
detection techniques is presented. The EWMA algorithm is described in the third section, 
followed by the fourth section dealing with the fuzzy approach. The simulation and results 
of analyzed algorithm and its various aspects in an adequate software environment are 
given in the fifth section. The sixth part elaborates the process of improving the results. 
Finally, this paper closes with the conclusion based on the analyzed cases. 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION 
The main challenge in intrusion detection is that of separating anomalous events from 
normal events. Anomalous events can include actual attacks against a computer system or 
more subtle and hence difficult to detect, probes that are aimed at information reconnaissance. 
Another challenge in ID is that of false positives. False positives in ID occur when an IDS 
reports an intrusion as occurring when in fact it has not. It has been argued that it is actually 
this false alarm rate that is the limiting factor in an IDSs performance. 
The performance of a network IDS can be more effective if it includes not only attack 
signature matching but also traffic analysis at the same time. By using traffic analysis, 
anomalous traffic is identified as a potential intrusion. Traffic analysis does not deal with 
the payload of a message, but its other characteristics such as source, destination, routing, 
length of the message, time it was sent, the frequency of the communication etc. 2. Traffic 
payload is not always available for analysis – the traffic may be encrypted or it may simply 
be against policy to analyze packet payload 12. 
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Anomaly detection techniques 13: 
 Protocol anomaly detection – Protocol anomaly refers to all exceptions related to 
protocol format and protocol behaviour. 
 Application payload anomaly – Application anomaly must be supported by detailed 
analysis of application protocols. Application anomaly also requires understanding 
of the application semantics in order to be effective. 
 Statistical anomaly – To fully characterize the traffic behaviour in any network, 
various statistical measures are used to capture this behaviour. Additionally, the 
implemented statistical algorithm must recognize the difference between the long – 
term (assumed normal) and the short – term observations to avoid generating false 
alarms on normal traffic variations. 
Network statistical anomaly detection (NSAD) attempts to dynamically understand 
the network and statistically identify traffic that deviates from normal traffic usage and 
patterns. NSAD systems can be broken down further into threshold, baseline and adaptive 
systems, with each looking for different triggers to identify anomalous behaviour 2. 
3. EXPONENTIALLY WEIGHTED MOVING AVERAGE 
Many intrusions manifest in changes in the intensity of events occurring in computer 
networks. Because of the ability of EWMA control charts to monitor the rate of occurrences 
of events based on their intensity, this technique is appropriate for implementation in 
control limits based algorithms. The performance of standard EWMA algorithm can be 
made more effective combining the concept of adaptive threshold algorithm and adequate 
application of fuzzy logic. 
The following section containing the theoretical background has already been discussed 
in previous works 14, 15, 16 yet it is vital for the comprehension of the entire paper to 
summarize it again. 
The exponentially weighted moving average is a statistic for monitoring the process that 
averages the data in a way that gives less and less weight to data as they are further 
removed in time. For the EWMA control technique, the decision regarding the state of 
control of the process depends on the EWMA statistics, which is an exponentially weighted 
average of all prior data, including the most recent measurements. 
The statistics that is calculated is: 
                        (1) 
for t = 1, 2, ...n 
where 
 EWMA0 is the mean of historical data 
 Yt is the observation at time t 
 n is the number of observations to be monitored including EWMA0 
 0 < λ ≤ 1 is a constant that determines the depth of memory of the EWMA. 
This equation is formulated by Roberts 17. By the choice of weighting factor λ, the 
EWMA control procedure can be made sensitive to a small or gradual drift in the process. 
The parameter λ determines the rate at which “older” data enter into the calculation of the 
EWMA statistic. A value of λ = 1 implies that only the most recent measurement influences 
the EWMA. Thus, a large value of λ = 1 gives more weight to recent data and less weight to 
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older data - a small value of λ gives more weight to older data 18. The value of λ is 
usually set between 0.2 and 0.3 19 although this choice is somewhat arbitrary. Lucas and 
Saccucci 20 have shown that although the smoothing factor λ used in an EWMA chart is 
usually recommended to be in the interval between 0.05 to 0.25, in practice the optimally 
designed smoothing factor depends not only on the given size of the mean shift δ, but also 
on a given in-control Average Run Length (ARL). ARL represents the average number of 
determined process points before the first point indices the appearance of out-of-control 
state (exceeding one of the control limits). 
The estimated variance of the EWMA statistics is approximately: 
      
  
 
   
    (2) 
when t is not small, where σ is the standard deviation calculated from the historical data. 
The center line for the control chart is the target value or EWMA0. The upper and 
lower control limits are 21: 
                  (3) 
                  (4) 
where the factor k is either set equal 3 (the 3-sigma control limits) or chosen using the 
Lucas and Saccucci tables 20.  
EWMA control chart is especially efficient in detecting small shifts of the monitored 
process – less than 1.5σ. 
Control charts are specialized time series plots, which assist in determining whether a 
process is in statistical control. Some of the most widely used forms of control charts are X-
R charts and Individuals charts. These are frequently referred to as “Shewhart” charts after 
the control charting pioneer Walter Shewhart who introduced such techniques. These charts 
are sensitive to detecting relatively large shifts in the process (i.e. of the order of 1.5σ or 
above). In computer network practice, shifts can be caused by intrusion or attack, for 
example. Two types of charts are usually used to detect smaller shifts (less than 1.5σ), 
namely CUSUM charts and EWMA charts. A CUSUM chart plots the cumulative sums of 
the deviations of each sample value from a target value. An alternative technique to detect 
small shifts is to use the EWMA methodology. This type of chart has some very attractive 
properties, in particular 14, 16: 
1. Unlike X-R and Individuals charts, all of the data collected over time may be used 
to determine the control status of a process. 
2. Like the CUSUM, the EWMA utilizes all previous observations, but the weight 
attached to data exponentially decreases as the observations become older and older. 
3. The EWMA is often superior to the CUSUM charting technique due to the fact 
that it detects larger shifts better. 
4. EWMA schemes may be applied for monitoring standard deviations in addition to 
the process mean. 
5. EWMA schemes can be used to forecast values of a process mean. 
6. The EWMA methodology is not sensitive to normality assumptions. 
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In real situations, the exact value of the shift size is often unknown and can only be 
reasonably assumed to vary within a certain range. Such a range of shifts deteriorates the 
performance of existing control charts. 
Calculating the optimal value of parameter λ is based on the study of authentic 
samples of network traffic. Random variations of network traffic are normal phenomena 
in the observed sample. In order to decrease or eliminate the influence of individual 
random variations of network traffic on occurrence of false alarms, the procedure of 
exponential smoothing is applied, as an aspect of data preprocessing. 
For any time period t, the smoothed value St is determined by computing: 
                    (5) 
where 0 < λ ≤ 1and t ≥ 3. 
This is the basic equation of exponential smoothing. The formulation here is given by 
Hunter 19. It should be noted that there is an alternative approach, in which, according 
to Roberts 17, yt is used instead of yt-1. 
This smoothing scheme starts by setting S2 to y1 (there is no S1), where Si stands for 
smoothed observation or EWMA, and yi stands for the original observation. The 
subscripts refer to the time periods 1, 2, ..., n.  For example, the third period is S3 = λ y2 + 
(1 – λ) S2 and so on. 
There is no generally accepted statistical procedure for choosing λ. In that situation, 
the method of least squares might be adequate to determine the optimal value of λ for 
which the sum of the squared errors (SSE) (Sn-1−yn-1)
2
 is minimized. 
The method of least squares represents a standard approach to the approximate 
solution of over-determined systems (i.e. sets of equations in which there are more 
equations than unknowns). The most important application is in data fitting. The best fit 
in the least squares sense minimizes the sum of squared residuals, a residual being the 
difference between an observed value and the fitted value provided by a model. 
Here is an illustration of this principle through an example 15. Consider the following 
data set consisting of n observations of data flow over time – for starting λ = 0.1: 
Table 1 Smoothing scheme 
Time Flow (yt) St Error (St – yt) 
Error 
squared 
1 y1    
2 y2 y1 E2 E22 
3 y3 S3 E3 E32 
... ... ... ... ... 
n yn Sn En En2 
    SSEn 
The sum of the squared errors (SSE) is then SSE0.1. After that, the SSE is calculated 
for λ = 0.2. If SSE0.2< SSE0.1 then SSE0.2 is better value for λ. This iterative procedure is 
related to the range of λ between 0.1 and 0.9. In this way, the best initial choice for λ is 
determined and then, for getting more precise value, search optionally continues between 
λ–Δλ and λ+Δλ, where Δλ is an arbitrarily small interval around λ (for instance, in 
practical applications, ± 10% around optimal λ). 
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The initial EWMA plays an important role in computing all the subsequent EWMA's. 
There are several approaches to define this value: 
1. Setting S2 to y1 
2. Setting S2 to the target of the process  
3. Setting S2 to average of the first four or five observations  
It can also be shown that the smaller the value of λ, the more important is the 
selection of the initial EWMA. 
The sensitivity of standard EWMA algorithm can be improved by implementing the 
logic of adaptive threshold algorithm 22. Namely, network anomaly in adaptive 
algorithm is detected only in case when for multiple consecutive time intervals (in the 
figure below marked with #) the threshold is exceeded (if # > k, where the factor k is set 
by network security administrator). The sensitivity of this algorithm also depends on the 
value of the threshold exceeding (βμt, where where μt represents the measured mean in 
some observation period). 
 
Fig. 2 Adaptive threshold algorithm 
With the theme of statistical anomaly detection in computer networks and implementation 
of EWMA statistics in network environment have dealt also the publications 23, 13, 15 
and 24. 
4. FUZZY APPROACH 
The intrusion detection problem is viewed in the misuse or signature model as a 
classification problem: the goal is to classify patterns of the system behaviour in two 
categories (normal and abnormal), using patterns of known attacks, which belong to the 
abnormal class and patterns of the normal behaviour. With fuzzy rules, the solution of 
this classification problem is based on fuzzy logic concepts. 
Fuzzy systems have several important characteristics that suit intrusion detection very 
well 10: 
 Fuzzy implementations had been showed to possess ability to readily combine 
inputs from widely varying sources (For instance, digital cameras are usually 
equipped with auto-focusing feature that estimates the distance. For this purpose, 
camera's fuzzy control system uses several different inputs). 
 Many types of intrusions cannot be crisply defined (e.g. the value of adaptive 
(variable) alarm threshold or network values, including intrusions, which in most 
real cases do not belong to a set of predefined values). 
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 The degree of alert that can occur with intrusions is often fuzzy - because there is 
no clear distinction between normal and anomaly traffic behaviour in a network. 
In fuzzy logic, fuzzy sets define the linguistic notions and membership functions 
define the truth-value of such linguistic expressions 25. A collection of fuzzy sets, 
called fuzzy space, defines the fuzzy linguistic values or fuzzy classes that an object can 
belong to. For instance, a fuzzy space of five sets (LOW, MED-LOW, MEDIUM, MED-
HIGH and HIGH) is shown in the following figure 26. 
 
Fig. 3 Fuzzy space of five sets 
With fuzzy spaces, fuzzy logic allows an object to belong to different classes at the 
same time. This possibility is helpful when the difference between classes is not well 
defined. It is the case in the intrusion detection task, where the difference between the 
normal and abnormal class are not well defined 27. 
The approach to the problem of anomaly detection by inducting the fuzzy logic into 
time based EWMA algorithm can be realized through several phases: 
Definition of set of possible values of the state (inputs) in multiple categories 
The basic concept of the analyzed algorithm is the following: for the input network 
traffic samples, correspondent EWMA values are calculated and observe as many 
consecutive values of how many sets the fuzzy space is composed. For the purposes of 
this analysis, the fuzzy space consists of three sets. It implies that the set of regular 
EWMA values of network traffic is divided, depending on the intensity, on three 
categories. For instance: low, medium and high EWMA value (in accordance with the 
defined membership function - in relation to the threshold, shown in Fig. 2).  
In addition to the criteria of traffic intensity, it is possible in a similar way to set the other 
variable criteria for anomaly detection as well - number of consecutive threshold (in this case, 
upper control limit) overcomes #. Since by its nature it represents a crisp value that can not be 
fuzzified, this paper will, for reasons of simplification of analysis - without loss of generality, 
accept the value of # = 3. This means that the fuzzy algorithm analyzes a block of three 
consecutive EWMA values (EWMA1, EWMA2 and EWMA3) and depending on their 
values, formulates the conclusion about the type of output. With implementation of exceeding 
parameter (the parameter that indicates the percentage above upper threshold; e.g. 0.5), fine 
tuning of the algorithm is provided, additionally eliminating false alarms. 
Definition of set of possible actions (or output types) in a few sets or categories  
In the case of anomaly detection, the possible set of output actions could be attack 
alarm, warning alarm and indication of normal condition. In this way, fuzzy outputs are 
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determined. In order to do this, it is necessary first to set up the empirical definition of fuzzy 
rules ("if - then" rules) or fuzzy relations. Fuzzy rules in this case may look like this: 
 If all three EWMA values of traffic are high (vrednost veća od thresholda), then 
attack alarm is generated. 
 If two values are high, and one is medium, then warning alarm is generated. 
 All other cases represent normal traffic situations. 
The next step is defining the membership function that describes the fuzzy sets. A 
membership function is a curve that defines how each point in the input space is mapped 
to a membership value (or degree of membership) between 0 and 1.  
There are different types of membership functions. The only condition a membership 
function must really satisfy is that it must vary between 0 and 1. The function itself can 
be an arbitrary curve whose shape is defined as a function that suits from the point of 
view of simplicity, convenience, speed, and efficiency. 
Fuzzy inference is the actual process of mapping from a given input to an output 
using fuzzy logic. 
5. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
For simulation of described fuzzy EWMA algorithm the software package “Matlab” - 
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox 2.0 was used. The basic simulation scheme of algorithm consists of 
three consecutive input EWMA values and one output value (Fig. 4).  
In the fuzzy logic toolbox, there are five parts of the fuzzy inference process: 
 Fuzzification of the input variables 
 Application of the fuzzy operator (AND or OR) in the antecedent 
 Implication from the antecedent to the consequent 
 Aggregation of the consequents across the rules 
 Defuzzification 
 
Fig. 4 Basic simulation scheme 
Two types of fuzzy inference systems (FIS) is possible to implement in the toolbox: 
Mamdani-type and Sugeno-type. These two types of inference systems vary somewhat in 
the way outputs are determined. Sugeno (or Takagi-Sugeno-Kang) method of fuzzy 
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inference is similar to the Mamdani method in many respects. The first two parts of the 
fuzzy inference process, fuzzifying the inputs and applying the fuzzy operator, are exactly 
the same. The main difference between Mamdani and Sugeno is that the Sugeno output 
membership functions are either linear or constant. Mamdani-type inference, as defined for 
the toolbox, expects the output membership functions to be fuzzy sets. After the 
aggregation process, there is a fuzzy set for each output variable that needs defuzzification 
28, 29. 
The membership functions for inputs and output are determined according to the 
following figures: 
 
 
Fig. 5 Input and output membership functions 
After creation of membership functions, the next step is formulation of fuzzy rules, 
which is realized using rule editor (Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6 Fuzzy rules 
The first check of this fuzzy algorithm is made in such way that input values 
(EWMA1 = EWMA2 = EWMA3 = 0.91) are selected with intention to generate an alarm 
situation. It was expected, in accordance with defined rules, to get relatively high output 
value, which was also actualized (output = 0.945). The practical choice of input values is 
realized by scrolling the vertical line that indicates the value, while the program 
automatically recalculates the value of output. 
 
Fig. 7 Rule viewer (alarm condition) 
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The form analysis of membership functions is done for selected combination of input 
values that generates warning and alarm indication. The situation in case of chosen input 
values that generates a warning condition, is given by Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8 Rule viewer (warning condition) 
Changing the offered membership functions 30, the output values were examined 
and compared. In case of warning, for „warning“ segment, the following output values 
are confirmed: 
Table 2 Output values - warning 
Membership function Output value 
triangular (trimf) 0.538 
generalized bell (gbellmf) 0.533 
Gaussian curve (gaussmf) 0.535 
two-sided composite Gaussian curve (gauss2mf) 0.533 
Similarly, in case of alarm, for „alarm“ output segment, the following values are 
confirmed: 
Table 3 Output values - alarm 
Membership function Output value 
triangular (trimf) 0.945 
sigmoidal (sigmf) 0.943 
difference between two sigmoidal functions (dsigmf) 0.944 
product of two sigmoidal functions (psigmf) 0.943 
Looking at the results from these tables, insignificant differences can be found in 
output values. However, triangular membership function provides the largest output value 
and may be concluded that it is the most appropriate shape for application in case of this 
security algorithm. 
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Simulation of algorithm in conditions of network anomaly 
As an illustration of the functioning of the described anomaly detection algorithm, the 
samples of network traffic (acknowledgement (ACK) numbers in TCP headers) can serve 
in observation time period with the parameters calculated on the basis of historical data: 
EWMA0 = 50 and σ = 2.0539, with λ accepted to be 0.3 (often used value). 
The control limits are in this case:  
UCL = 50 + 3*(0.4201)*(2.0539) = 52.5884 ≈ 52.6  
LCL = 50 – 3*(0.4201)*(2.0539) = 47.4115 ≈ 47.4 
Data from Table 4 derive from local server using a packet sniffer (Wireshark) that 
captures and filters packets according to specific protocol. In order to see only captured 
packets using the TCP protocol, in the Filter field is necessary to enter "tcp" as shown in 
Figure 9 (example). Extracting the ACK numbers of packets (rounded data values) is 
realized 35 times, at equal time intervals (5 minutes). 
 
Fig. 9 Filtering TCP packets 
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Table 4 Network traffic samples and EWMA values 
Sample Data EWMA 
0 
 
50.00 
1 52 50.60 
2 47 49.52 
3 53 50.56 
4 49.3 50.18 
5 50.1 50.16 
6 47 49.21 
7 51 49.75 
8 50.1 49.85 
9 51.2 50.26 
10 50.5 50.33 
11 49.6 50.11 
12 47.6 49.36 
13 49.9 49.52 
14 51.3 50.05 
15 47.8 49.38 
16 51.2 49.92 
17 52.6 50.73 
18 52.4 51.23 
19 53.6 51.94 
20 52.1 51.99 
21 53.9 52.56 
22 53 52.69 
23 52.9 52.76 
24 52.5 52.68 
25 51.8 52.42 
26 49.7 51.60 
27 50.5 51.27 
28 49.9 50.86 
29 48.5 50.15 
30 49.6 49.99 
31 51.2 50.35 
32 48.3 49.74 
33 50 49.81 
34 50.4 49.99 
35 51.6 50.47 
Analyzing the values in the table above, it should be noted that three consecutive 
values of network traffic in the marked samples 21-23 are above the UCL (the 19th 
sample is a single case that is not of interest for analysis), simulating in this way the 
situation suspicious to alarm. These elevated traffic values result in expected increase in 
the three consecutive EWMA values (22-24 - marked), which also exceed the UCL value. 
Accepting that each network value that is for 20% or more greater than UCL (threshold 
= 1.2*UCL, analogy with Fig. 2) is a situation which can be interpreted as a certain alarm, 
and bearing in mind the form of membership functions (Fig. 5), the situation of warning is 
at about 80% (between 0.75 and 0.9 more precisely) of the alarm situation, which is 0.8*0.2 
= 0.16. It gives an alarm threshold value of 52.75 (UCL + 0.16). Among the three marked 
EWMA values that exceeded the threshold, only one was greater than 52.75. Deciding on 
 EWMA Statistics and Fuzzy Logic in Function of Network Anomaly Detection 263 
 
the basis of the majority logic (one alarm situation and two warnings), it is concluded that 
the analyzed network situation can be interpreted as a warning. 
6. IMPROVEMENT OF RESULTS 
In further phase of research, the improvement possibility of previously obtained 
results will be examined. In that sense, the idea was to predefine some of the built-in 
fuzzy operators, because Fuzzy logic toolbox offers this opportunity. The situation when 
all three inputs have high values was analyzed. Firstly, it is found that the choice of some 
other Or method and aggregation does not affect the output value. In And method, the 
options “min“ and “prod“ were examined and determined the correspondent output 
values 0.945 (min) and 0.934 (prod). In this research, instead of function “min“, the 
function of square root of minimum is proposed and tested its impact on the output value. 
This function is defined in file customand.m as: 
function y=customand(x) 
y=sqrt(min(x)), 
and gave the output result 0.949, which is better than “min“ function’s result. 
In addition to this, research has shown that “prod“ function from Implication part 
generates higher output signal then “min“ function, which represents another improvement. 
Similarly, it is shown that “mom“ option (mean of maximum) instead of popular 
“centroid“ from Defuzzification part has the greatest impact on output. 
Considering the previous improvements, testing the output values was performed with 
the following selected options (Fig. 10). The final result of this research is given by Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 10 The final fuzzy inference options 
 
Fig. 11 The final result 
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Analyzing the last figure, it is necessary to emphasize the greatest value of output 
(0.99), which proves the correctness of presented conclusions. The percentage of 
improvement compared to the previous case (0.945) is about 5%. 
7. CONCLUSION 
On the basis of elaboration presented in this paper it can be concluded that the 
introduction of fuzzy logic in standard EWMA algorithm for anomaly detection - the so-
called fuzzy EWMA (FEWMA) algorithm - opens the possibility of previous warning 
from a network attack, which contributes to raising the level of security. Standard EWMA 
algorithm does not have this opportunity. Besides, fuzzy logic enables precise determination 
(fine tuning) of degree of the risk (expressed in form of percentage). 
It is important to emphasize that here proposed improvement of standard EWMA 
algorithm can be applied to other algorithms based on threshold, since EWMA algorithm 
in its basis, is security algorithm with fixed threshold. 
The future work will focus on creating opportunities for practical testing of the presented 
approach in real time. This involves enabling the automation of algorithm functioning by 
creating the appropriate software for taking live-network traffic samples, calculating EWMA 
values and real-time decision-making, and linking these functions with fuzzy module that 
has the ability to adjust the membership functions of the input and output.  
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